唐华斑竹

唐华斑竹：著名KOL，区块链研究者，财经学者。 2013年开始加密货币交易，拥有丰富的交易经验，左侧交易者，风格偏稳健，注重强安全边际，坚守既定策略和纪律，追求长期稳定收益和高胜率。欢迎志同道合的朋友加入一起交流，一起成长！

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Stock price at one cent, daily turnover 3,641 HKD, what’s left of Gome? At the close on September 10, Gome Retail was at 0.01 HKD, unchanged, with a daily turnover of 364,800 shares and a transaction amount of 3,641 HKD. Three thousand six hundred forty-one HKD. Not three million, not three hundred thousand, but just over three thousand HKD, which is less than the equivalent in RMB. Once, Gome, together with Huang Guangyu, topped China’s richest list three times, with a market value that once exceeded 90 billion HKD. Now, the total market cap on the Hong Kong stock market is only 764 million HKD, with the stock price stuck at one cent for a long time. Even the basic trading unit of 1,000 shares in the Hong Kong market is worth only 10 HKD. Investment banks have even grown lazy to rate it; within 90 days, no institution is willing to look at it. In the capital market, it is already dead. From richest man to penny stock, nineteen years In 1987, 18-year-old Huang Guangyu rented a small store under 100 square meters in Beijing’s Zhushikou, selling home appliances under the Gome Electric brand. Relying on the principle of "small profits but quick turnover," he expanded stores nationwide. In 2004, he backdoor listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange at age 35. In 2004, 2005, and 2008, Huang Guangyu topped the Hurun Rich List three times, becoming China’s youngest business legend at the time. Huang’s glory abruptly ended in 2008 when he was taken for investigation. In 2010, he was sentenced to 14 years for illegal business operations, insider trading, and unit bribery. Afterward, Gome entered the era of professional managers but was severely weakened by control disputes with the Huang family. Meanwhile, JD.com and Tmall were aggressively devouring offline home appliance retail market share. By the time Huang Guangyu was released and returned in 2021, having publicly vowed to "restore the original market position within 18 months," Gome was already unrecognizable. That statement later became a joke. He took over a Gome full of holes. Data shows that since 2017, Gome Retail’s net profit attributable to the parent company has been negative for eight consecutive years. In 2024, the full-year loss was 11.629 billion RMB, with revenue only 474 million RMB, shrinking over 99% from the 76.7 billion RMB peak in 2016. In the first half of 2026, losses continued at 1.346 billion RMB, with total liabilities at 42.201 billion RMB and a debt-to-asset ratio of 209%, already insolvent. By the end of the first half, Gome had 624 pending lawsuits involving about 6 billion RMB, with overdue bank loans and bonds totaling 16.2 billion RMB. In February 2025, Gome’s A-share listed platform, Gome Communications, was officially delisted. In September, Beijing Gome Electric Co., Ltd. was listed as a dishonest executor with a case amount of 2.027 billion RMB. The once-famous slogan "Buy appliances at Gome" now appears in the judicial system as a defaulter. Desperate self-rescue efforts fail It’s no longer Huang Guangyu’s era, but he has not stopped struggling to save Gome in recent years. In 2023, Gome entered Douyin and Kuaishou for live streaming sales, with hosts promoting small appliances on camera, but the live rooms consistently had single-digit viewers and failed to make any impact. At the start of 2024, Gome launched "instant warehouses" and community convenience stores, claiming to learn from Meituan and JD Daojia, but the capital chain was broken, warehouses couldn’t open, and goods couldn’t be stocked. At the end of the same year, Gome suddenly announced entry into new energy vehicle sales, opening an experience center in Beijing, which the public generally did not understand. Early 2025, Huang Guangyu loudly declared "opening 10,000 community supermarkets within three years" to capture community consumption traffic, but after half a year, no stores appeared. The latest was in September 2025, when Huang Guangyu established Beijing Gome Hydrogen Energy Technology Co., Ltd. with a registered capital of 10 million RMB, personally attending the hydrogen energy conference as chairman. Within five days, a strategic cooperation agreement was signed with Guo Hydrogen Technology under State Power Investment Corporation. A company that started selling home appliances moving into hydrogen energy—outside observers have even lost the interest to question. Every transformation was grandiose, every time ended silently. Traditional retail clings to life This may not be Gome’s fault, nor a failure of Huang Guangyu’s ability. The collapse of traditional offline retail is the fall of an era, not just one company. Yonghui Superstores may be the most typical example in this collapse. Once the "first stock of people’s livelihood supermarkets," it had nearly a thousand stores nationwide at its peak. Since 2021, Yonghui has lost money for five consecutive years, with cumulative losses exceeding 11.6 billion RMB. In May 2024, Yonghui announced comprehensive learning from Pang Donglai, with Pang personally guiding. Stores lowered shelves, expanded aisles, introduced private labels, and the remodeled Zhengzhou flagship store’s first-day sales hit 1.88 million RMB, 13.9 times the pre-remodeling sales. But the cost of this learning was heavy. In 2025, Yonghui closed 381 stores, remodeled 315, with one-time expenses for renovations, closure penalties, and employee compensation exceeding 1.2 billion RMB. The net loss attributable to the parent company expanded to 2.552 billion RMB. In two and a half years, over 600 Yonghui stores disappeared from the map. By the first half of 2026, Yonghui finally turned profitable, with net profit attributable to the parent company of 253 million RMB. But Chairman Zhang Xuansong dampened enthusiasm at the earnings meeting, saying "there is still room for improvement." However, breaking it down, over 80% of this 253 million RMB profit came from non-recurring gains and losses, with net profit excluding non-recurring items only 38.9 million RMB. CEO Wang Shoucheng announced the remodeling entered the second phase, shifting from rapid expansion to refined cultivation. In 2026, no large-scale store closures or remodeling, only closing 25 and remodeling 50 stores, entering a "rest and recuperation" phase. Pang Donglai has taught them basically everything; the rest Yonghui must walk alone. RT-Mart is even more turbulent. Entering mainland China in 1999, it reached 40.4 billion RMB revenue in 2009, topping China’s retail. In 2017, Alibaba took control, investing over 50 billion HKD to transform it into a new retail benchmark. However, from 2018 to fiscal 2024, revenue declined year after year, with a 1.668 billion RMB loss in fiscal 2024. Early 2025, Alibaba sold 78.7% of Gaoxin Retail’s shares to Dehong Capital for 13.1 billion HKD, about a 70% discount. Dehong Capital hasn’t settled down either. Four CEOs changed in two years; the latest, Li Weiping, was missing and dismissed after only two months, rumored related to past issues at Hema. Current board chairman Hua Yun, founder of Dehong Capital, is serving as a "zero salary" interim to put out fires. Fiscal 2026 is expected to lose 300 to 350 million RMB, with hypermarket business officially turning from profit to loss. As of September 2025, RT-Mart hypermarkets shrank from a peak of 602 to 462 stores, and closures continue. Refusing to accept fate The entire retail industry is contracting. Industry estimates show that over 1,200 hypermarkets larger than 500 square meters have closed nationwide in the past two years. The traditional supermarket model relying on entry fees, display fees, and credit terms—the "sublessor" model—has been torn apart by instant retail, snack wholesale, and community fresh food. Consumers no longer want a hypermarket that has everything; they either go to e-commerce, hard discount stores, or nearby convenience stores. Huang Guangyu is 57 this year. He’s still struggling. In January 2026, he was appointed an entrepreneurship mentor by Shenzhen Chaochuang Association, with Ma Huateng as honorary president. A near-bankrupt former richest man now acting as an "entrepreneurship mentor"—that in itself is quite ironic. They are all people who refuse to accept fate. But the times wait for no one. Reading note: This article is only a summary of public information and personal views and does not constitute any investment advice. Data and facts mentioned are subject to regulatory authorities, exchanges, and company announcements. @WEEXcn for contracts, come to WEEX. One account to trade Crypto, US stocks, gold, and global markets ☺️